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Abstract Checklists that focus attention on key variables might allow clinicians to find
and fix their mistakes. However, whether this approach can be applied to clinicians of
varying degrees of expertise is unclear. Novice and expert clinicians vary in their pre-
dominant reasoning processes and in the types of errors they commit. We studied 44
clinicians with a range of electrocardiography (ECG) interpretation expertise: novice,
intermediate and expert. Clinicians were asked to interpret 10 ECGs, self-report their
predominant reasoning strategy and then check their interpretation with a checklist. We
found that clinicians of all levels of expertise were able to use the checklist to find and fix
mistakes. However, novice clinicians disproportionately benefited. Interestingly, while
clinicians varied in their self-reported reasoning strategy, there was no relationship
between reasoning strategy and checklist benefit.
Keywords Reasoning strategies  Checklists  Expertise  System processing  ECG
interpretation  Diagnostic errors
Introduction
Finding a mistake and fixing it is not easy. If the mistake is a wrong diagnosis, then
Groopman in his popular book ‘‘How Doctors think’’, suggests revisiting the decision in a
careful analytic way (Groopman 2007). This process of revisiting decisions to find and fix
mistakes can be formalized using checklists, an approach which has been widely
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advocated, but not well studied (Gawande 2009). This differs from the more traditional use
of checklists during decision-making, where they function as a decision aid (for example
see Berbaum et al. 2006). Instead, checklist use after decision-making function as a
proofreading tool to detect errors. Designing such a checklist to facilitate error detection
requires an understanding of how diagnostic decision-making leads to errors. Diagnostic
decisions are a form of global or summative assessment requiring the integration of
multiple key variables (Kahneman 2011). Errors can occur when clinicians overlook key
variables, are swayed by irrelevant variables, or lack necessary knowledge to formulate a
correct hypothesis. A checklist focusing clinician attention on key variables can provide an
opportunity to correct errors caused by overlooking key variables or overweighing irrel-
evant variables. While preliminary data suggests benefits to this approach among experts, it
is unclear whether this benefit applies equally across all levels of expertise. There are two
concerns in applying this approach across all levels of expertise. First, there are obvious
differences in how novices and experts approach diagnostic problems (Ericsson 2004; Patel
and Groen 1991). Second, novices and experts likely commit errors for different reasons
(Groves et al. 2003).
A well-studied difference between a novice and expert approach is the predominant type
of reasoning processing involved. Reasoning processes can be categorized into two sys-
tems: automatic, intuitive, effortless processes termed system 1 and methodical, analytical,
effortful processes termed system 2 (Evans 2010). A useful analogy is to think of system 1
processes as a search engine that jumps to decisions, whereas system 2 processes are akin
to a calculator that arrives at a decision through incremental steps. For instance, when
trying to retrieve a lost wallet, you could search your brain and realize where the wallet
was left using a system 1 process, or systematically retrace your steps using a system 2
process. While the distinction between these two thought processes is somewhat arbitrary,
system 1 can be recognized in think-aloud protocols, short decision times, and even by
clinician’s self-reflection. In a study of clinicians interpreting ECGs, self-report of system 1
processes was correlated with short decision times and objective assessment of reasoning
processes in post hoc think-aloud protocols (Sibbald and De Bruin 2011). In these post hoc
think-aloud protocols, system 1 processing was objectively discerned when clinicians did
not deliberate, but described immediate recognition of a diagnosis or jumping to an answer
without referring to any intermediate steps.
As clinicians acquire expertise, the proportion of system 1 or automatic processing
increases (Eva and Cunnington 2006). Because system 1 processes are more prone to
influence by external factors (i.e., biases), encouraging system 2 processes among experts
has been frequently proposed to reduce error (Croskerry 2003). Checklists may be a useful
tool for this purpose. Using a checklist after a decision to check decision-making is an
inherently analytic task, likely to encourage system 2 processing. Predictably, this type of
checklist improved diagnostic decisions amongst experts by approximately 10 %. How-
ever, novices and intermediates tend to use system 1 processes less often, and may even
benefit from instruction to encourage system 1 processes. Prior study suggested that
novices learn better when encouraged to use both systems (Ark et al. 2006, 2007). While
learning and checking are two different tasks, these findings cast doubt on whether non-
experts will benefit from the use of checklists to find and fix mistakes.
Experts and novices are also prone to different types of errors. While classifying errors
has been criticized because it is prone to assumption and subjective interpretation, dif-
ferences are nevertheless apparent. Experts are more likely to overlook key data, but less
likely to make a mistake in generating a hypothesis. In contrast, novices are more likely to
formulate a faulty hypothesis and less likely to overlook data (Groves et al. 2003). While
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novices are less likely to overlook data, they have more difficultly separating relevant from
irrelevant data (Gegenfurtner et al. 2011). Overweighing irrelevant data may partly explain
the novices’ tendency to generate faulty hypotheses.
Whether a checklist can help detect both types of errors is unclear. We hypothesize that
checklists comprised of key variables might help both novices and experts, but in different
ways. For experts, this type of checklist encourages review of all relevant data, potentially
reducing the errors noted in data collection. For novices, this type of checklist may limit
attention to key variables thereby enabling better hypothesis generation. However, the
literature surrounding this type of strategy includes conflicting reports of success. In one
experiment, a computer program suggesting diagnoses based on user-entered consistent
and inconsistent clinical features resulted in a disproportionate benefit amongst novices
(Friedman et al. 1999). However, whether the benefit occurred because the intervention
focused attention on relevant variables or because alternate hypotheses were suggested is
unknown. Checklists can only do the former and not the latter. Trainees asked to manually
generate hypotheses after listing consistent and inconsistent clinical features, did not
improve their diagnostic accuracy (Kulatunga-Moruzi et al. 2001). However, this study did
not force novices to focus on key variables, which might be a necessary ingredient in
formulating correct hypotheses.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the benefit of checklists in finding
and fixing diagnostic errors across the spectrum of expertise. The secondary purpose of the
study was to understand whether the benefit of checklists was dependent on the predom-
inant type of thought process initially used in making a decision. We hypothesized that (1)
checklists that focused attention on key variables would enable clinicians to detect and fix
errors regardless of their level of expertise; (2) checklists that focused attention on key




Novices, intermediates and experts with 2–3 years, 4–5 years and 8–11 years of ECG
interpretation experience were recruited by email. All participants were recruited in 2012
from the University of Toronto. Novices were recruited from the second and third year
medical school class, intermediates from the internal medicine residency program and
experts from the cardiology fellowship program.
Material
10 ECGs were selected from a common ECG textbook to cover a broad range of material
(O’Keefe et al. 2010). Diagnoses are listed in Table 1.
The checklist was based on six key variables in ECG interpretation. It was originally
derived by two experts using two ECG textbooks and was used in a prior study. The
checklist items included: 1. Did I get the rate right? 2. Did I scan the entire strip to confirm
the rhythm? 3. Is the axis really normal? 4. Did I check each chamber (right atrium, left
atrium, right ventricle, left ventricle) for hypertrophy? 5. Did I check each territory
(anterior, posterior, inferior, lateral, septal) for ischemia? 6. Did I miss any abnormal
intervals: PR, QRS, QT?
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Protocol
The study was constructed using an online survey platform (SurveyGizmo,
www.surveygizmo.com). Participants were introduced to a self-reflective reasoning scale
to judge whether system 1 or 2 processes were predominantly used in interpreting an ECG.
The instrument asks ‘‘How did you interpret this ECG?’’ with four possible answers: (1) it
was a pattern I immediately recognized, (2) mostly through pattern recognition, (3) mostly
through analyzing its different aspects, (4) I analyzed each of its components. Participants
studied a worked example and then completed a sample ECG interpretation using the
instrument. This instrument was used previously in a similar experimental setup with
intermediates (Sibbald and De Bruin 2011). In this previous study, two observers inde-
pendently applied the same four-point scoring system based on post hoc think-aloud
protocols with good agreement between observers and participants. Interpretation times
were also recorded, showing an expected 40 % increase with self-report of analysis.
Participants were asked to interpret each of the 10 ECGs with the following instruction:
‘‘Interpret this ECG as you normally would’’. Participants completed a self-reflective
reasoning scale after interpreting each ECG. Participants were then shown each ECG again
with their original interpretation. Participants were asked to check their interpretation with
the checklist. Time taken to interpret and check the interpretation were measured.
Outcome
An ECG expert, blinded to participant group and self-reported reasoning, reviewed each
interpretation and counted errors. Each omitted diagnosis and each additional incorrect
diagnosis was counted as an error.
Errors were summed for each participant pre and post checklist use and compared with
a repeated ANOVA using reasoning strategy as a within subject variable and experience
level as a between subject variable with a full factorial design. Interpretation time and
checklist time were also compared with repeated ANOVAs using individual ECGs as
within subject variables and experience level as a between subject variable. Analysis was
conducted with SPSS 20 (IBM, Redmond).
Ethical approval was obtained by the Health Sciences Research Ethics Board, Uni-
versity of Toronto.
Results
Forty four participants analyzed 10 ECGs each: 16 novices, 20 intermediates and 8 experts.
The mean number of errors per ECG was 2.9 (range 0–7, SD = .9) and per participant was
29 (range 6–41, SD = 9.1). Errors differed by experience level (F2,41 = 12.1, gp
2 = .37,
p \ .0001, Table 2). Experts made fewer errors than both novices and intermediates (mean
difference ± standard error -15 ± 3 and -13 ± 3 respectively, both p \ .0001).
The mean time to interpret each ECG was 103 s (SE = 12 s). Interpretation time tended
to vary by experience level (F2,41 = 2.9, gp
2 = .14, p = .06). Novices took more time than
either intermediates or experts (mean difference ± standard error 51 ± 24 and 63 ± 31 s
respectively, both p \ .05). Intermediates took similar time compared with experts (mean
difference ± standard error 13 ± 30 s, p = .67).
Self-reported reasoning varied by experience level (F6,41 = 3.2, gp
2 = .12, p = .02,
Fig. 1). As experience increased, so did self-report of ‘‘it was a pattern I immediately
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recognized’’ (F2,41 = 7.1, gp
2 = .26, p = .002). Post hoc testing with LSD correction
revealed significant differences between all three groups. Experts reported this type of
reasoning more often than intermediates and novices (mean difference ± standard error
.11 ± .05, p = .03; .23 ± .06, p = .001 respectively). Intermediates reported this type of
reasoning more often than novices (mean difference ± standard error .12 ± .06, p = .06).
Self-report of ‘‘mostly through analyzing its components’’ also varied by experience level
(F3,41 = 4.5, gp
2 = .181, p = .02). Post hoc testing with LSD correction revealed experts
were less likely to report this type of reasoning than intermediates and novices (mean dif-
ference ± standard error -.24 ± .08 p = .01; -.18 ± .08, p = .03 respectively). However,
Table 1 ECG diagnoses
ECG Diagnoses
1 Sinus arrest with junctional escape, prolonged QT, premature ventricular contractions in a bigeminal
pattern and nonspecific ST changes. Consider digoxin toxicity
2 Sinus rhythm, right bundle branch block, right axis deviation, right ventricular hypertrophy with
strain pattern
3 Sinus rhythm, DDD pacer
4 Short run of narrow complex tachycardia (most likely atrioventricular reentry tachycardia) followed
by sinus rhythm with left atrial enlargement
5 Sinus arrhythmia, accessory (Wolf Parkinson White) pathway
6 Sinus tachycardia, anterior and inferior ST elevation consistent with acute MI, right bundle branch
block and left posterior fasicular block
7 Atrial flutter with 2:1 block and left anterior fasicular block
8 Sinus rhythm, Brugada pattern
9 Pre-excited atrial fibrillation with very rapid rates up to 300
10 Sinus rhythm, Mobitz type 1 s degree AV block, junctional escape and acute inferior ST elevation
MI
Fig. 1 Reasoning strategy by experience level
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the difference between intermediates and novices was not significant (mean differ-
ence ± standard error -.06 ± .06, p = .34).
Self-report of ‘‘mostly through pattern recognition’’ and ‘‘I analyzed its components’’
did not vary by experience level (F3,41 = 1.1, p = .35 and F3,41 = 1.6, p = .22
respectively).
The number of errors varied by self-reported reasoning (F3,39 = 5.9, gp
2 = .31,
p = .002). Self-report of ‘‘it was a pattern I immediately recognized’’ and ‘‘I analyzed each
component’’ were both associated with fewer mistakes than self-report of ‘‘mostly through
pattern recognition’’ and ‘‘mostly through analyzing its components’’ (all p’s \ .03;
Table 3).
Participants fixed a mean number of 1.6 errors when using the checklist (SE = .44,
F2,41 = 12.2 gp
2 = .37, p = .001, Table 2). This varied inversely with experience
(mean ± standard error 2.6 ± .68, 1.6 ± .61 and .05 ± .97 for novices, intermediates and
experts respectively), though these differences were not statistically significant
(F2,41 = 1.7, gp
2 = .08, p = .20). The number of errors fixed did not vary by self-reported
reasoning used for initial interpretation (F2=3,39 = .21, gp
2 = .11, p = .21). Time spent
using the checklist was 80 ± 17 s for novices, 57 ± 15 s for intermediates and 20 ± 24 s
for experts (F2, 40 = 2.1, gp
2 = .10, p = .13).
Discussion
In this study, we confirmed our hypothesis that checklists would be helpful to clinicians
regardless of expertise level. We found that novices, intermediates and experts were all
able to use a checklist to find and fix mistakes in ECG interpretation. The magnitude of the
benefit was not small. On average, one mistake was detected using the checklist for every 8
ECG interpretations that were scrutinized. This benefit is similar to that described among
experts previously, as well as the benefit found among intermediates using with a similar
style checklist for cardiac physical exam (Sibbald et al. 2013a, b). This benefit stands in
Table 2 Errors, self reported reasoning and experience level










Self reported reasoning (by ECG)
It was a pattern I immediately
recognized
73 4.2 ± 0.7 0.3 ± 0.1 7.1 ± 2.4 3.9 ± 0.7
Mostly through pattern recognition 161 10.9 ± 1.1 0.8 ± 0.3 7.3 ± 2.8 10.1 ± 1.1
Mostly through analyzing its
components
125 9.0 ± 1.0 0.5 ± 0.2 5.6 ± 2.2 8.5 ± 1.0
I analyzed each component 81 4.5 ± 0.9 0.2 ± 0.1 4.4 ± 2.2 4.3 ± 0.9
Level of expertise (by participant)
Novice 16 32.4 ± 1.8 2.6 ± 0.7 8.0 ± 2.2 29.8 ± 1.9
Intermediate 20 30.5 ± 1.6 1.6 ± 0.6 5.2 ± 2.0 28.9 ± 1.7
Expert 8 16.5 ± 2.5 0.5 ± 1.0 3.0 ± 6.1 16.0 ± 2.8
Total 44 26.5 ± 1.2 1.6 ± 0.4 6.0 ± 1.5 24.9 ± 1.2
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contrast to prior study of checklists during decision making, where they function as a
decision aid rather than a proofreading tool (e.g., Berbaum et al. 2006). While these
differences may be due to the skill or population studied, we argue that the timing of
checklist application is the most important variable (for an in-depth discussion of this issue,
see Sibbald et al. 2013a, b).
Importantly, novices benefited just as much if not more than intermediates and experts.
The simplest explanation for this finding is that novices were more likely to find mistakes
because they were more likely to make mistakes. However, other explanations are possible.
For instance, checklists may help experts and novices differently. This study did not
investigate what participants were actually doing when they were checking their inter-
pretations with the checklist. Nevertheless, the differences in time spent on the task
between experts and non-experts suggest that experts and non-experts were completing the
task differently. Investigating how experts and non-experts use a checklist may be fruitful
ground for future research. In particular, eye tracking technology may be a useful modality
to explore exactly what experts and non-experts are doing when using a checklist. Such
data would provide significant insight into the mechanism of checklist benefit.
Our data on reasoning strategies also provide an explanation for the disproportionate
benefit among novices. Experts reported combination reasoning (mostly pattern or mostly
analysis) less often than pure reasoning (only pattern recognition or only analysis). This
provides evidence that experts are tailoring their approach to the ECG, selecting pure
analytic or pattern recognition strategies when it is best suited to the content. This finding
resembles a form of reflective expertise, where expert behavior includes the ability to
efficiently mix problem solving strategies to optimize success (van Merrienboer 1997). By
tailoring their reasoning strategy, experts may reduce the need for a checklist. This is also a
suggested subject for future research. While tailoring a reasoning strategy might be a
surrogate marker for expertise, it may also be a teachable skill that could accelerate the
development of expertise.
Interestingly, our second hypothesis that checklists would have a disproportionate
benefit where system 1 strategies were used was not supported by our data. The benefit of
the checklist did not vary across different self-reported reasoning strategies. This suggests
the checklist was not simply a tool to ‘‘balance’’ reasoning strategies. If this were the case,
a checklist presumed to facilitate system 2 processes should have disproportionate benefit
where predominantly system 1 or pattern recognition processes caused the errors. It is also
possible that the checklist facilitates both types of processes. However, a previous study
with a similar model suggested only analytic review of ECG interpretations was helpful
(Sibbald and De Bruin 2011). Alternately, our use of retrospective reporting of reasoning
may be insufficiently sensitive to categorize different reasoning strategies.
Several limitations of this study are worth mentioning. First, only a single skill was
assessed. This strategy of checklist use to find and fix mistakes needs to be tested in other
areas before widespread adoption can be promoted. The approach may be better suited to
diagnostic test interpretation where key variables are readily isolated and all information is
present in front of the participant. Second, we did not determine whether the benefit of
checklists use was related to the additional time spent checking the interpretation or the
checklist itself. Prior study compared checking with a checklist versus checking without
specific direction and found benefit only with use of a checklist (Sibbald et al. 2013a, b).
This suggests an added benefit to checklist use, but is a worthwhile question for future
study. Third, while participants varied in experience level, they were all from a single
center. Because attitudes towards checklists may play a role in their efficacy, replication in
another setting seems prudent.
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In summary, checklists comprised of key variables were helpful to all levels of expertise
finding and fixing mistakes in ECG interpretations. This benefit was particularly pro-
nounced among novices, and did not vary based on initial reasoning strategy. Adopting a
checklist strategy to confirm visual test interpretations holds significant promise to reduce
error.
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Gegenfurtner, A., Lehtinen, E., & Säljö, R. (2011). Expertise differences in the comprehension of visual-
izations: A meta-analysis of eye-tracking research in professional domains. Educational Psychology
Review, 23(4), 523–552.
Groopman, J. (2007). How doctors think. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Groves, M., O’Rourke, P., & Alexander, H. (2003). Clinical reasoning: The relative contribution of iden-
tification, interpretation and hypothesis errors to misdiagnosis. Medical Teacher, 25(6), 621–625.
Table 3 Comparison of errors between different reasoning strategies
All mean difference (I–J)
± standard error
Reasoning strategy (J)













It was a pattern I
immediately
recognized
































50 M. Sibbald et al.
123
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Toronto, ON: Doubleday.
Kulatunga-Moruzi, C., Brooks, L., & Norman, G. (2001). Coordination of analytic and similarity-based
processing strategies and expertise in dermatological diagnosis. Teaching and Learning in Medicine,
13(2), 110–116.
O’Keefe, J., Hammill, S., Freed, M., & Pogwidz, S. (2010). The ECG criteria book (2nd ed.). Sudbury:
Jones and Bartlett Publishers.
Patel, V., & Groen, G. (1991). The general and specific nature of medical expertise: A critical look. In K.
Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 93–125).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sibbald, M., & De Bruin, A. B. (2011). Feasibility of self-reflection as a tool to balance clinical reasoning
strategies. Advances in Health Science Education,. doi:10.1007/s10459-011-9320-5.
Sibbald, M., de Bruin, A. B., Cavalcanti, R. B., & van Merrienboer, J. G. (2013a). Do you have to re-
examine to reconsider your diagnosis? Checklists and cardiac exam. BMJ Quality Safety, 22(4), 333–
338. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-001537.
Sibbald, M., de Bruin, A. B., & van Merrienboer, J. J. G. (2013b). Do checklists improve experts’ diagnostic
decisions? Medical Education, 47(3), 301–308.
van Merrienboer, J. J. G. (1997). Training complex cognitive skills: A four-component instructional design
model for technical training. New Jersey: Educational Technology Publications.
Checklists for clinicians of varying levels of expertise 51
123
